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THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
TROUBLE FOR THE MATERIALIST
OR THE EMERGENT DUALIST?
Warren Shrader

As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a unity-ofconsciousness (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument
and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant
one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then
argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to
fear from Hasker's argument, for a separate premise detailing the explanatory relationship that must hold between physical and mental states is false, or
at least unmotivated by Hasker's reasoning. I then turn the tables on Hasker,
showing how the unity theses discussed open the way to an argument against
emergent dualism. My conclusion is that the unity of consciousness actually
poses a greater problem for the emergent dualist than for the materialist.

Recently, in the pages of this journaP as well as in his latest book, 2 William
Hasker revives and defends the idea, discussed by Descartes, Leibniz, and
Kant, among others, that the unity of conscious experience implies that the
mind is not a material object. This unity-oj-consciousness (UOC) argument
functions as Hasker's main argument against materialism as he builds his
case for his preferred theory of the mind, emergent dualism, according to
which not only are there emergent mental properties (causally efficacious
properties dependent on, yet irreducible to, physical properties) but emergent mental substances (minds) as well.
Despite the central role this UOC argument plays in his project, it is not
entirely clear what Hasker means in saying that conscious experience is
unified, nor is it obvious how his thoughts on unity support the premises
of the argument. A thorough analysis of his argument thus requires an investigation into what unity theses Hasker endorses. Before embarking on
such an investigation, however, it will be helpful to review the general contours of Hasker's argument and construct a formalized version of it. With a
solid understanding of the argument secured, I hope to show that Hasker
requires two distinct unity theses to lend credence to two distinct premises of his UOC argument. Though these unity theses are plausible, I think
Hasker's argument ultimately fails in that a separate premise is false, or at
least highly dubious given the rationale Hasker offers for believing it.
l. Hasker's Argument Formalized

The fullest presentation of Hasker's argument appears in his book The
Emergent Self, wherein he asks us to consider as a premier example of a
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unified conscious experience his awareness of his entire visual field at a
time (p. 125). Having such an awareness, claims Hasker, is just being in a
particular mental state, call it 'SQ' and presumably being in this state corresponds to the mind's instantiating a certain qualitative property, call it
'Q.' Hasker thinks the existence of SQ poses a significant problem for the
materialist, whose view Hasker characterizes as entailing that the mind is
a composite material object consisting of distinct subunits (proper parts),
some of which are responsible for modeling or representing distinct portions of information about the external world. 3 Since it does not seem possible that any of these proper parts of the brain exemplify Q for each represents only part of the information from Hasker's visual field, it must be
the brain itself, or a large part thereof, that exemplifies Q. (Let us assume,
for ease of discussion, that the materialist identifies the mind with the entire brain-the argument will apply equally well to the mind as any other
composite physical object). The materialist's problem is accounting for the
brain's exemplifying Q for if the brain is a system of its subunits, reasons
Hasker, then the brain's exemplification of Q must consist in its parts having the properties and relations they do. This follows from a more general principle Hasker endorses, the Principle of Reducibility, which he
adopts from Wilfrid Sellars:
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property

of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such
and such qualities and stand in such and such relations, or roughly,
every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and
relations between, its constituents.4
Hasker thinks Sellars intends and that we should interpret the locution
"consist in" to mean "logically or conceptually necessitated by." But conscious properties do not so consist in properties of the brain's parts, reasons Hasker. First, it is a clear truism that one's brain being aware of one's
visual field cannot consist in its subunits being aware of the information
they model, for proper parts of persons are not conscious and, even if they
were, a conjunction of partial awarenesses does not imply the existence
of a "total awareness," which is exactly what state S is supposed to be (p.
128). And if the subunits are not aware of the information they model,
then they exemplify only non-qualitative properties, the instantiation of
which do not logically imply the instantiation of a qualitative property.s
Ergo, materialism is false.
We can formalize Hasker's UOC Argument as follows. Let 'm' denote
the mind, 'p' the brain, and 'Pl' Pz ... Pn' the subunits of the brain that
model information. Let 'Qx' denote the qualitative property of Px and 'Tx'
denote Px's "total intrinsic property," a conjunctive property whose instantiation entails the instantiation of all the intrinsic properties exemplified by
Px' 'R' denotes the complex relational property whose instantiation entails
the instantiation of all the relations instantiated by the members of Pl' .. Pn'
And let SQstand for the mind's exemplifying Q SQx for the state that is Pxexemplirymg-Qx and STX for the state that is px-exemplifying-Tx' Finally, let
expressions in italics represent states of affairs, e.g., Qp is the state of affairs
that is the brain's exemplifying Q. The argument proceeds as follows:
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(1) SQ exists (i.e. Q is exemplified by m)
(2)

If Q is exemplified by p, then either:

a. SQ must consist in SQl & SQ2 & ... & SQn or
b. SQ must consist in STl & ST2 & ... & STn & R(PI ... p n)6
(3) SQ consists in STl & ST2 & ... & STn & R(PI ... Pn) only if S~s logically
or conceptually necessitated by STl & Sn & ... & STn & l«Pl ... p)
(4) - [SQ consists in SQl & SQ2 & ... & SQn]
(5) - [SQ is logically or conceptually necessitated by Sn & Sn & ... &
STn & R(Pl ... p)]
(6) Q is not exemplified by p
[2,3,4,5]
(7) P is not m

[I, 6 , Indiscemibility of Identicals]

From here on I will refer to STl & Sn & ... & STn & R(pJ ... Pn)' the conjunction of the property instantiations of and relations between the parts of the
brain, as P arts Since this is a UOC argument, we would expect at least one
premise toPexpress a substantive thesis about the unity of consciousness or
at least to receive its warrant from such a thesis. With that in mind, I tum
to an examination of Hasker's thoughts on the unity of consciousness to
determine if anything he says can be interpreted as an endorsement of a
unity thesis supporting premises of his argument.

II. Hasker on the Unity of Consciousness
Hasker offers many examples of the unity of consciousness but never an
explicit characterization of it. In addition to the example already introduced (one's entire visual field at a time), Hasker suggests that we could
consider also as a datum the 'unified' experience of simultaneously feeling a tickle, hearing a twig snap, and smelling gasoline." (p. 126, f. 40). The
trouble is that none of these examples is very instructive, as each is consistent with a variety of unity theses discussed in the literature, some of
which are fairly trivial and of no relevance to Hasker's UOC Argument?
However, Hasker at least implicitly endorses one substantive unity thesis,
one that serves as a key premise in an argument he claims as a predecessor to his own, the argument Kant critiques in his second paralogism.
This argument proceeds from the premise that the action of any aggregate
consists in the actions of its proper parts to the conclusion that thinking
is only possible of a substance which, "not being an aggregate ... is absolutely simple." 8 The intermediate premise is a thesis about the unity of
consciousness, which can be stated as follows:
II

Mental State Unity Thesis (MSUT): A thought (mental state) is unified
in that it cannot consist in different representations distributed among
different beings.
I think we can best make sense of MSUT if thoughts are understood as
events or states that can be composed by other events or states (consider
how a baseball game is composed of many distinct, simultaneous eventsthe first pitch, the last out, etc.). Kant appears to dismiss the argument
of the second paralogism by rejecting MSUT, claiming that since MSUT
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is not a conceptual truth, we cannot rule out a priori thoughts consisting
in other events acting together. But Hasker clearly favors MSUT. If we
assume, as Hasker does, that states involving awarenesses are types of
representational states, then premise (4) of the UOC argument is simply a
direct consequence of MSUT.
But premise (4) is not the only premise of Hasker's UOC Argument
contingent on a unity claim. It seems to me that Hasker requires an additional unity thesis in support of premise (1), for the existence of SQis a
substantive claim in need of support. In saying this, I am not suggesting
that there is any question as to whether Hasker experiences a unified visual field (though I disagree with him about the unity of consciousness,
I do not deny him the experience of it!); rather, I am questioning why his
experience should be construed as his being in one mental state. Perhaps
Hasker's awareness of his visual field amounts to his being in numerically
diverse states, all simultaneous, and all standing in the relation of "being
co-conscious." Barry Dainton has defended such an account of the unity
of consciousness. According to Dainton, "being co-conscious" is a fundamental, non-reducible relation that binds all of a subject's simultaneous
conscious states together. 9 To illustrate this, suppose Hasker's visual field
consists of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a blue diamond. His being
aware of his entire visual field would simply entail his being in the three
distinct states, being aware of a yellow moon (call this Y), being aware of
an orange star (0), and being aware of a blue diamond (B), each involving
its own constitutive qualitative property, all standing in the co-conscious
relation. One who holds this view need not concede that Hasker's total
awareness is a specific conscious state," and is not compelled to accept
the existence of S or the truth of (1). Advocating (1) thus amounts to taking
up a position on the structure of unified consciousness and thus requires
a principle to support it. But MSUT is not up to the task. Though MSUT
implies that SQ has a certain property (not consisting in representations
distributed among different beings) if it exists, MSUT (along with Hasker's being in states Y, 0, and B) fails to imply that SQ exists. So armed only
with MSUT, Hasker's argument is in trouble at (1).
Fortunately for Hasker there is a further unity thesis that has been discussed in the literature that does imply the existence of S, one not explicitly
endorsed by Hasker but nonetheless consistent with his expressed views
on the unity of consciousness. Hasker hints at this additional thesis in his
description of S as "my awareness of my present visual field" (p. 125), suggesting that this state possesses its own phenomenology requiring us to
countenance it as a separate state. What Hasker appears to have in mind,
then, is that when he is in conscious states Y, 0, and B, he is concurrently
in conscious state Z (being aware of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a
blue diamond), a state with its own phenomenology and its own constitutive qualitative property. This type of unity has been described by Tim
Bayne and David Chalmers, who refer to it as phenomenal unity:
II

Two conscious states are subsumptively phenomenally unified (or
simply phenomenally unified) if there is something it is like for a subject to be in both states simultaneously... When A and B are phenomenally conscious states, there is something it is like for a subject to
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have A, and there is something it is like for a subject to have B. When
A and B are phenomenally unified, there is not just something it is
like to have each state individually: there is something it is like to
have A and B together. lO
Bayne and Chalmers further elaborate on this passage by saying that, in
essence, consciousness exhibits phenomenal unity when there is a set of
phenomenal states such that the phenomenology of each member is subsumed by a further state.ll We can thus cash out phenomenal unity more
succinctly as follows:
Phenomenal states Xl ... Xn (comprising set P) are phenomenally unified
iff there is some state Y that subsumes the phenomenology of all the
members of P.
This basic idea can be extended to all of an individual's conscious states,
resulting in the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (PUT):
PUT: For any set of phenomenally conscious states of a subject at a given time, all the members of that set are phenomenally unifiedY
PUT entails that if Hasker has any visual states at all, then SQ exists. PUT
seems crucial to the success of "asker's UOC argument-it provides the
warrant for (1) and thereby allows the argument to get off the ground. The
question is, once the argument is off the ground, does it have any legs?
Though I take no issue with premises (3), (4), and (5), and (1) seems solid
given PUT, I do think (2) is dubious, especially given Hasker's reasons
for accepting itY The remainder of my analysis will consist in a detailed
discussion of premise (2).

III. Hasker on the Explanatory Relation between SQand Pparts
Premises (2) and (3) jointly imply that if p exemplifies Q, then SQ must
be logically or conceptually necessitated by P arts But should the materialist accept (2)? Only if compelled to believe Pthat qualitative properties
are governed by the Principle of Reducibility. But I don't see why she
should believe this. There is a related principle that the materialist would
surely accept:
Explain: all intrinsic properties of p are explainable in terms of Pparts
Explain entails that SQ is explainable in terms of P arts But why think explaining the mental properties of p requires a logica{or conceptual link to Parts?
Very few materialists would champion such a requirement-most w6uld
endorse the view that conscious properties of the mind are" epistemically
emergent," that they are caused or realized by physical properties of the
brain or its parts, but not logically or conceptually necessitated by them. I
would venture that such a position is near orthodoxy within contemporary
philosophy of mind. That alone is no reason to think (2) is false, but it does
suggest we should look at alternative interpretations of Explain and see
why Hasker rejects them. Here are the three primary interpretations I see:
(i)

all intrinsic properties of p are logically or conceptually necessitated by P parts
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(ii) all intrinsic properties of p are metaphysically necessitated by
P parts

(iii) all intrinsic properties of p are causally or nomologically necessitated by Pparts.
The only materialists who would endorse (i) are the more extreme materialists: a priori identity theorists, analytical functionalists, or eliminativists.
Options (ii) and (iii) express the preferred modes of explanation for most
materialists, the former being embraced by a posteriori identity theorists
and those who hold that the physical realizes the mental, the latter by
those who advocate a causal emergence theory (CET), according to which
mental property instances are distinct from, yet caused by, physical property instances. 14 Hasker's emergent dualism is a version of CET (albeit an
anti-materialist one) since it entails that the mind's states are caused by
the states of p's parts. In principle then Hasker is not opposed to causal or
nomological necessitation between physical and mental states. Why does
he deny the materialist this option?
The reason Hasker thinks the materialist cannot embrace (iii) is that
p, as a composite material object, is strictly speaking a system of objects,
and this implies that there can be no causal process connecting P arts with
SQ. Hasker's defense of (2) ultimately boils down to an additiori'al argument he presents for this conclusion, which I shall call Defense (from
p. 139 of The Emergent Self I have changed some of Hasker's notation to
match my own).
(D1)

Suppose SQ is not logically or conceptually deducible from
P parts .

(D2)

Ppa,ts

(D3)

There is a causal process (CP) connecting Pparts with SQ [from
D2]

(D4)

CP consists of events involving concrete individuals

(DS)

The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most PI'
P2' ... , Pn and P

(D6)

P is not a concrete individual distinct from PI' P2' ... , Pn

(D7)

The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most PI'
P2' ... , Pn [ DS, D6 ]

(D8)

All the events involving PI' P2' ... , Pn are already included in
Pparts,

(D9)

CP is not a causal process that connects P arts with SQ [ D1, D6,
D7, D8]
p

causally necessitates SQ (Provisional Assumption)

THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
(OlD) It is not the case that
indirect proof]

Pparts

39

causally necessitates SQ [ 03, 09

Though Hasker does not seem to notice this, or does not mention it, an argument analogous to Defense could be mounted against the materialisms
that entail (ii). Simply replace the word 'causally' with 'metaphysically'
in (02), and replace reference to causal processes with reference to supervenience relations. A little reflection will show that one would arrive at
the conclusion that it is not the case that P parts metaphysically necessitates
S . So if Defense and its analogous argument are sound then this does
effminate all interpretations of Explain other than (i) and provides us with
good grounds for accepting premise (2) of Hasker's UOC Argument.
Unfortunately for Hasker, Defense is not sound. The rub comes in premise (06). The most natural reading of this premise seems to be as follows:
(06)* If:3x (x = p), then x = PI' or x = P2' or ... or x = Pn

Recall that p is the brain and PI' P2 ... Pn are its proper parts. If the antecedent of (06)* is true, then the consequent is false, for no object can be
identical to one of its proper parts. So (06)* is true only if -::lx(x=p), i.e. only
if there is no object picked out by 'p.' But premises (01), (02), and (03) all
imply that 'p' does pick out a concrete individual, for all of those premises
imply that p exemplifies a property (remember that SQ just is the state of the
mind's-in this case p-exemplifying Q). SO if (06) is read as (06)*, it is either false, or renders several other premises in the argument nonsensical.
However, there is perhaps a more charitable reading of (06). Hasker
suggests that when an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then
the whole "is nothing but a system of objects ... there is no such thing
as a whole 'over and above' the sum of the parts" (p. 130). Another philosopher who speaks this way is O.M. Armstrong, who in discussing the
part/whole relationship writes: "whatever supervenes or ... is entailed
or necessitated ... is not something ontologically additional to the subvenient, or necessitating, entity or entities. What supervenes is no addition
of being."Is Perhaps then we should take Hasker's (06) to be expressing a
supervenience relation between the properties of p and the properties of
Pi' P2 ... Pn· I suppose this is a type of strong supervenience, with the operative modality being at least metaphysical necessity. This understanding of (06) can now be expressed as follows:
(06)** The properties of p strongly supervene (with metaphysical necessity) on P parIs

However, even given this interpretation of (06), (07) does not follow. The
truth of (06)** does not exclude p from being an individual involved in a
causal process. Hasker might argue that since p's existence and its properties are entailed by the existence and properties of p's parts, there is no
room for S to be caused by the properties of p's parts, as (02) stipulates.
But this doesn't follow-supervenience is a synchronic, noncausal explanation; it does not" compete" with causal explanations. As a matter of fact,
it may very well be that the causal relationship between ParIs and SQ that
Hasker finds so problematic partially explains the superveriience relationship. Suppose one held that properties were individuated by their causal
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powers, and that the causal powers of properties were essential to them,
thus making the laws of nature metaphysically necessary.16 Then, if there
is a causal law (synchronic though it be) linking the properties involved
in P ~~ to Q SQ follows from PFt' with metaphysical necessity. If one were
to add the assumption that Q's causal profile is such that it can only be
caused by the properties involved in Ppafts' then Q strongly supervenes on
these properties, and the fact that P arts causes SQ is an explanation (or a
partial one at least) of this superveni~nce.
However, if one is not comfortable with synchronic causation, or the
idea that the causal powers of properties are essential to them, one can
still sketch a picture representing the denial of (07) as consistent with
(06)**. Suppose S occurs at a time t2 later than t l , and that parts of the
brain instantiate s~ightly different properties at those times (so that, for
example, PI instantiates T j at tj and Tj* at t 2). Here are two explanations of
p's exemplifying Q:
(I)

p exemplifies Q at t2 because Q supervenes on Tj*pj & T2*Pz & ... &
Tn*Pn & R*(pj .... Pn) at t2·

(II) P exemplifies Q at t2 because SQ is causally necessitated by Tjp] &
T2P2 & ". & T"p" & R(p]" .. p) at t j •

I see nothing inconsistent in these explanations. But if there is nothing
inconsistent in them, then (07) does not follow from (06)**. I suppose one
might try to advance an argument for the inconsistency of (I) and (II), but

there is no such argument to be found in Hasker.
Given all this, I think we should conclude that Defense is unsound. Either (D6) is false, or (D7) does not follow from (DS) and (D6). Thus, I think
that Hasker has not given us any reason to think that (i) is a better interpretation of Explain than (ii) or (iii). But the warrant one has for accepting
(2) of the UOC Argument accrues from the warrant one has for denying
(ii) and (iii) as viable interpretations of Explain. So I think we have little
warrant for accepting (2), and thus the materialist should not feel at all
threatened by Hasker's UOC Argument.

IV. A UOC Argument against Emergent Dualism
Given that Hasker's UOC Argument fails, Hasker has given us no convincing reason to think the unity of consciousness poses a problem for
materialism. However, I believe there may be excellent reason to think the
unity of consciousness poses a problem for Hasker's emergent dualism;
in fact, I think it poses a problem for all varieties of CET, as I will argue
presently. It is at least true, I will contend, that this argument against CET
based on PUT is stronger than Hasker's UOC Argument, for the former
relies on assumptions that are less contentious than the claim that (i) is the
only viable interpretation of Explain. My argument, which I will call the
UOC Argument against CET actually requires an extension of PUT, what
I will call the Modally-charged Phenomenal Unity Thesis, or McPUT:
McPUT: Necessarily (in all metaphysically possible worlds), for any set
of simultaneous phenomenally conscious states of a subject, all members of that set are phenomenally unified.
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Once one accepts PUT, making the move to McPUT does not seem much
of a stretch-it is hard to imagine how if PUT is true it is not true at all
possible worlds. Still, I admit my upcoming argument is most vulnerable
at McPUT itself, inasmuch as PUT is vulnerable. However, since PUT is a
sword that Hasker seems to wield in his own argument against materialism, I take it as a reasonable starting point in constructing an argument
against his viewY
Allow me then to briefly sketch the UOC Argument against CET and
offer some points in its favor. 18 Suppose MI and M2 are distinct, simultaneous phenomenal states of a subject and MT is the state subsuming the
phenomenology of M[ and M2 • Also suppose that C I , C 2 and CT are states
that are the causes of M I, M2 and MT respectively. CET implies that C l, C 2
and CT all involve at least one physical state. But on the supposition that
all causal laws involving at least one physical state are contingent, it is
possible that even though CI, C z and CT all occur, MT could fail to occur
while MI and M2 do occur. But McPUT implies that this is not possible. So
McPUT implies the denial of CET. 19
Reaching this conclusion obviously depends upon, one, accepting that
causal laws involving physical states are contingent and, two, accepting
that this contingency implies that MT is metaphysically independent from
(i.e. does not follow with metaphysical necessity from) MI and M z. Now
while I think it is reasonable to consent to both of these suppositions, denying one or the other is certainly a way for the advocate of CET to sidestep the troublesome (to her) conclusion of my argument. I want to briefly
comment on each of these potential ways out, suggesting that they may
not be as promising as one might initially think. Denying that the laws of
nature are contingent as a rule involves accepting that the causal powers
of properties are essential to them. But accepting such a thesis about properties should not sit well with the proponent of CET. One of the principal
motivations for embracing CET is to countenance the novel causal powers
of conscious states. But if emergent properties follow with metaphysical
necessity from physical properties, it seems we lose motivation to include
emergent properties in our ontology. If the instantiation of some physical
property P' metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of an emergent
property E at some later time, and if the instantiation of a distinct physical
property P* at a still later time necessarily follows from the instantiation
of E and a third physical property P, it seems simpler to attribute E's causal
powers to P and either eliminate E or identify E with P. Another way to
state this concern is that it seems more ontologically parsimonious to suppose that physical entities have latent causal powers "activated" only in
certain contexts and that such causal powers belong to the entity's physical properties. 20 So, it is not clear that embracing the metaphysical necessity of laws involving physical states is the panacea the proponent of CET
might hope it to be. zl
With respect to the second way out for the defender of CET, the most
natural reason for denying that the contingency of laws involving physical states implies Ml and M z could occur without MT is to say that the
laws involving MT supervene on the laws involving M[ and M z• Even so,
my argument for the incompatibility of CET and McPUT would still go
through if there were a nomologically possible world in which MI and M z
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are instantiated but none of the potential causes of MT are instantiated.
And that sure seems possible, enough so that the proponent of CET owes
us an explanation why it is not possible. Perhaps the most promising explanation would be that MT just is the conjunction of M1 and M2 • But if
there is such a thing as the conjunction Ml and M z' it is not at all clear that
it is a mental state. One can be in the state of believing A and the state of
believing B without being in the state of believing A and B. This would not
be possible were this latter belief state the conjunction of the former states.
So the advocate of CET must provide a good reason for supposing that
phenomenal states differ from belief states in this regard for this response
to carry much weight.
V. Conclusion

In sum, I think there is a sound basis for thinking the CET-theorist faces a
formidable challenge in accommodating the unity of consciousness. By my
lights, UOC Argument against CET is stronger than Hasker's UOC argument in that the former relies on less controversial supporting premises.
Thus, I believe it is emergent dualism, not materialism, that confronts the
greater challenge from the unity of consciousness. Admittedly though, I
have only scratched the surface of a satisfactory defense of PUT, and I have
given only the tersest response to some potential objections to the other crucial premises of the UOC Argument against CET. Only a more detailed
exploration of PUT, as well as potential rejoinders to the reasons I have
proffered for thinking PUT incompatible with CET, will decide whether the
challenge the unity of consciousness poses to CET is or is not insuperable. 22
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NOTES
1. "Concerning the Unity of Consciousness," Faith and Philosophy 12:4,
pp. 532-547.
2. The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). All page
number references in the text are to this book.
3. The term 'materialism' as I use it should be understood as a thesis only
about the mind, and not the more ambitious thesis that everything is material.
As I've defined materialism, one way for the materialist to skirt the conclusion
of the UOC argument is to hold that the mind is a material simple, a view that
seems implausible to me, but is immune from Hasker's argument.
4. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 27,
quoted in The Emergent Self, p. 130. I assume that when Sellars and Hasker
speak of one property "consisting in" another, this is useful shorthand for saying that certain facts or states of affairs consist in other facts or states of affairs.
Throughout the paper, I will often employ this useful shorthand as well.
5. Again, to say that instantiations of non-qualitative properties do not logically or conceptually necessitate the instantiation of qualitative ones is shorthand for saying that the facts describing such instantiations do not bear such a
relation to each other. In endorsing this thesis, Hasker is siding with those who
defend an explanatory gap between physical facts and mental facts.
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6. This premise assumes that it could not be the case that p and mare
distinct and yet both exemplify Q. But I assume that is an assumption both
materialists and dualists would agree upon-it would seem metaphysically
extravagant to have two distinct entities instantiating qualitative properties
responsible for consciousness.
7. For lists and discussion of various unity theses, see Barry Dainton,
Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience (London:
Routledge, 2000) and Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, "What is the Unity of
Consciousness?" in A. Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding,
Integration, Dissociation (Oxford, 2003), pp. 23-58. Hasker explicitly endorses
one trivial type of unity, what Bayne and Chalmers call subject unity or SUT.
Two conscious states are subject unified if they belong to the same subject at
the same time. This comports with what Hasker says in footnote 40 on p. 126
of The Emergent Self that the only "unity" he has in view "is the mere fact of
being experienced simultaneously by a single subject." But SUT really has no
role to play in Hasker's UOC argument, for there is no premise whose truth
depends on SUT. So Hasker is incorrect in saying that this type of unity is all
nis argument requires.
8. See Kant's Critique of Pure Reasoll, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1965), p. 335 (A352)
9. For his development of the unity of consciousness in terms of coconsciousness, see Dainton, Stream of Consciousness.
10. Bayne and Chalmers, in "What is the Unity of Consciousness?" p. 32.
11. Roughly, we can say that if phenomenal state PI subsumes phenomenal state P2, then "what it's like to be" in P2 is included in "what it's like to
be" in PI.
12. Mike Rea raised to me the objection that PUT faces a serious problem,
for it appears that if it is true, an implausible regress ensues. Suppose a subject is in distinct phenomenal states PI and P2. According to PUT, the subject
must also be in P3, a state subsuming the phenomenology of PI and P2. But
since P3 is also a phenomenal state, PUT implies there must be a state P4
subsuming the phenomenology of P1-P3, and then a state P5, P6, and so on.
So it appears that if one a subject is in even one phenomenal state, she is in
an infinite number. The way out of this regress, it seems to me, is to recognize
that the subsumption relation is reflexive. So, if one is in distinct phenomenal
states PI and P2 subsumed by P3, P3 subsumes not only PI and P2, but also
itself, obviating the need for the further states P4, P5, etc. This is the response
Bayne and Chalmers give to a similar objection. See "What is the Unity of
Consciousness?" p. 40.
13. Some may question why I do not object to (3). Premise (3) doesn't trouble me in that it seems a reasonable way to interpret the locution "consists
in." Clearly some properties of objects bear this relation to the properties of
their parts-'having mass of 5 kg' is probably a prime example of a property
of a whole that "consists in" the properties and relations of the parts of the
whole.
14. One prominent defender of CET (other than Hasker) is Timothy
O'Connor. See his "Causality, Mind, and Free Will," Philosophical Perspectives,
14 (2000), pp. 105-117.
15. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge University
Press, 1997), p. 12.
16. See, e.g., Sydney Shoemaker "Causality and Properties," in Time and
Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Peter van Inwagen (ed.), (Dordecht:
Reidel, 1980), pp. 109-36. Later I offer a reason for thinking that the proponent
of CET should not adopt this view, but I raise the possibility here merely as a
way for her to respond to Hasker.
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17. Hasker has objected to me that PUT is not necessary to premise (I),
for a separate case could be mounted (independent of PUT) for the existence
of SQ' In other words, all his argument requires is a particular truth, that Sq
exists, and not a universal generalization like PUT. But it's hard to see what
a defense of SQ divorced form PUT would look like. I have already suggested
that the expenential evidence we have for a unified consciousness can be accommodated by a view like Dainton's which entails that SQ does not exist. It
just seems to me that any suggestion that PUT is false, but that SQ still exists
would be ad hoc. But I leave it to the reader to decide.
18. I present a fuller exposition and defense of the premises of this argument in my dissertation, which is entitled liThe Metaphysics of Ontological
Emergence"
19. The reader might wonder, given that my rejection of Hasker's UOC argument was ultimately based on my rejection of Defense, Hasker's argument
against CET, whether the soundness of this new argument against CET would
vindicate Hasker's UOC argument. The answer is no. Though the soundness
of my argument would eliminate (i) as a viable interpretation of Explain, it
would not eliminate (ii). Thus a materialist would still have a principled reason for denying (2) of Hasker's argument, namely, that (ii) is a better interpretation of Explain than (i).
20. Also, another way to look at this, the metaphysical necessity of the
laws and the fact that properties are individuated by their causal powers implies that E and P are always co-instantiated when the antecedent and consequent circumstances are the same. This seems strong motivation to at least
identify the instance of E with the instance of P. Does this imply the reduction
of the E type? I think it does, but this is a complex issue that I can't discuss
here. I should note that Hasker endorses the view that the causal powers of
properties (property instantiations, actually) are essential to them, and thus
that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary (see, for example, The
Emergent Self, p. 71), but he does not discuss the objection I have raised. Timothy O'Connor, however, in an unpublished paper co-authored with Hong Yu
Wong entitled liThe Metaphysics of Emergence," does discuss this objection
in some detail. These authors suggest it is actually more reasonable and ontologically parsimonious to posit emergent properties rather than "hidden"
physical dispositions. I disagree with them, but clearly the issues surrounding
this point are complex and require much more investigation into the nature of
ontological reduction and ontological parsimony before anything decisive can
be said.
21. The proponent of CET might be tempted to respond that the laws of
nature, though necessary, are probabilistic, thus allowing her to say that E
does possess novel causal powers, in that the laws relating (E and P') to P* are
distinct from laws relating P' to P*, because the "chances" involved in such
laws are different. But "going chancy" backfires. Admitting that laws of nature are only probabilistic implies that, even though the law relating CTto Mr
obtains, CT still might occur without MT occurring, and this seems to suggest
that M and M might occur without M .
22. 1: would like to thank David Charmers, Alvin Plantinga, Mike Rea, Fritz
Warfield, and most especially William Hasker for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. The paper also benefited from the helpful suggestions of
two anonymous referees.

